Russell on Peano's axiomatization of arithmetic
Abstract
Meu objetivo nesse artigo é examinar a preocupação de Russell com a justificação filosófica da caracterização da aritmética pela teoria dos conjuntos como é apresentada em sua argumentação nos primeiros capítulos de seu livro Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy. Através desse exame procurarei responder as seguintes questões: quais os argumentos que Russell usa para justificar sua concepção de que números são conjuntos? São bons argumentos? Do ponto de vista conceitual qual é o ganho que se tem a partir dessa concepção?
Abstract
My main purpose in this article is to examine Russell's concerns with the philosophical justification of the set theoretical characterization of arithmetic presented in his argumentation in the first chapters of his book Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy. Through this exam I will seek to answer the following questions: what argumentation does Russell use in order to justify his conception that numbers are sets? Is it sound? What do we attain, from a conceptual point of view, from this approach?
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